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In this paper, we study a two-stage model in which a manufacturer expands to a new 
market through a local retailer and has private information on the advertising 
effectiveness. The manufacturer chooses the information sharing format with the 
retailer, either no information sharing or mandatory information sharing. Under no 
information sharing format, the manufacturer and the retailer play a signaling game. 
We derive both separating and pooling equilibria and conduct equilibrium refinements 
for the signaling game. Under mandatory information sharing format, the manufacturer 
simply informs the retailer the advertising effectiveness. We also establish the stylized 
model and derive the optimal advertising effort. By comparing the manufacturer’s ex 
ante profit under the two information sharing formats, we find that the manufacturer 
always prefers mandatory information sharing, under which both the advertising effort 
and profit can be higher. We also observe that unlike the common case that the channel 
members may have different preference over the information sharing formats, the 
manufacturer and the retailer can actually achieve alignment. While some previous 
studies suggest that the manufacturer and the retailer may have different preference 
over the information sharing formats, we find that they can actually achieve alignment 
with asymmetric information on advertising effectiveness. 
 








World merchandise exports have almost doubled from about US$10 trillion in 2005 to 
US$ 19.67 trillion in 2018 (WTO 2019, UNCTAD 2019). With the significant growth 
in global trade and an increasing number of affluent consumers in developing countries, 
expanding and conducting business globally has become essential to many businesses. 
When entering new markets overseas, companies usually seek partnership with local 
distributors in order to minimize cost and risk, meet local regulatory requirements, and 
benefit from local distributors’ unique expertise of their own markets (Arnold 2000). 
Manufacturers often attempt to directly influence consumers’ purchase decisions 
through the use of advertising to overcome differing objectives between the retailers 
and themselves (Lal and Narasimhan 1996) and to achieve noteworthy brand successes 
(Interbrand 2019). For example, Procter & Gamble (P&G) began its advertising 
campaigns almost two years before entering China’s market (Riley 2013). 
Meanwhile, large brand-owning manufacturers such as P&G, Unilever, and Coca-
Cola, regularly conduct market research on demand and consumer preferences (Jiang 
et al. 2016). For instance, in order to open the Russian market, P&G collaborated with 
St. Petersburg University to gain a comprehensive understanding of the local market 
and develop its advanced distribution system (Pepper 2012). Also, manufacturers can 
have exclusive sales and predication experience in their home country. As a result, it is 
not necessarily true that downstream retailers are better informed of market information 
than upstream manufacturers, especially when products are introduced to a new market. 
In fact, manufacturers can have better information about the factors that affect sales of 
their own products (Gal-Or et al. 2008) as well as advertising effectiveness (Desai 2000). 
Without such private information, retailers may react in a way that results in suboptimal 
pricing and losing sales. Such supply chains operate in environments characterized by 
escalating levels of information asymmetry in terms of demand, quality and cost 
(Bakshi 2015, Li et al. 2017, Chod et al. 2019). However, very few studies have looked 
into information asymmetry on advertising effectiveness in an emerging supply chain.  
One remedy for this problem is information sharing between manufacturers and 




advertising information with the retailer. When such mandatory information sharing is 
absent or perceived as unreliable by retailers, manufacturers can also signal favorable 
information to their retailers by increasing wholesale price and/or advertising 
expenditure (Chu 1992, Desai 2000, Ebrahim‐Khanjari 2012, Guo and Jiang 2016). 
Thus, in this research, we ask the following questions: Shall the manufacturer 
voluntarily and explicitly share its advertising effectiveness information with the 
retailer? Moreover, if the manufacturer does choose no information sharing, then what 
should be the manufacturer’s optimal signaling strategy? Regardless, what would be 
the optimal wholesale price and advertising effort for the manufacturer? 
To answer these questions, we consider a two-stage model for a manufacturer 
expanding to a new market. The manufacturer will conduct advertising in the new 
market and sell through a local retailer. Before entering the new market, the 
manufacturer chooses an information sharing format and a wholesale price. After 
expanding to the new market, the manufacturer can obtain private information about 
advertising effectiveness by conducting investigations. The manufacturer then 
determines the advertising effort under the pre-determined information sharing format. 
Under no information sharing format, we study the signaling game between the 
manufacturer and the retailer. We derive both pooling and separating equilibria on the 
advertising effort and the conditions for their existences. We also conduct the 
equilibrium refinement to derive the unique lexicographically maximum sequential 
equilibrium. Under mandatory information sharing format, we solve the stylized game 
model. We then investigate the manufacturer’s profit to determine the ex ante optimal 
wholesale price under each information sharing format.  
By comparing the manufacturer’s ex ante optimal profit under the two information 
sharing formats, we find that the manufacturer always prefers the mandatory 
information sharing. Previous literature indicates that when the manufacturer has 
private information, the retailer prefers no information sharing because the 
manufacturer’s downward distortion in the wholesale price endows the retailer a higher 
profit margin. However, in our model, the private information is signaled through the 




the retailer may also prefer mandatory information sharing, which signifies that the two 
supply chain members can achieve alignment regarding the information sharing format. 
We also find that the manufacturer’s advertising effort under no information sharing 
format is no greater than that under mandatory information sharing format. 
Subsequent sections are organized as follows. We review related literature in 
Section 2. Section 3 provides the basic modeling framework and characterizes the 
conditionally optimal advertising efforts and retail price. We then investigate the 
manufacturer’s optimal strategy under no information in Section 4 and that under 
mandatory information sharing in Section 5. Section 5 also compares the two 
information sharing formats. Section 6 concludes our paper with a summary of our 
findings, implications, and limitations. 
2 Literature Review 
Our research is related to two streams of literature: signaling under information 
asymmetry, and supply chain management with advertising effort.  
Signaling is a type of a dynamic Bayesian game that applies principle-agent theory, 
and it arises when one player who owns private information takes effort to credibly 
reveal the information to the player who lacks information. The most common private 
information is market demand because a down-stream supply chain member, which is 
closer to the market, is better informed of demand information than its upstream partner. 
For example, Li et al. (2014) investigate supplier encroachment into a retailer’s market 
where the retailer owns private information of market size and signals through order 
quantities. They show that such information asymmetry will magnify double 
marginalization. The supplier encroachment under information asymmetry is further 
explored by considering risk attitude (by Li et al. 2017), production cost reduction (Sun 
et al. 2019), and product quality (Zhang et al. 2019). Anand and Goyal (2009) consider 
a supplier trading with two retailers, where one is an informed incumbent and the other 
is an uninformed entrant. The incumbent, if acquires information, can then signal to the 
supplier through order quantities, and the supplier then decides whether to leak the 




information leakage by the supplier, the incumbent may prefer not to acquire 
information even if it is costless. Yan et al. (2017) also investigate a model with one 
supplier and two retailers with asymmetric information. Four sourcing strategies 
corresponding to different moving sequences are investigated. They show that the 
asymmetric retailers have misaligned preferences over the moving sequences. Li and 
Zhou (2019) consider a horizontal supply chain with an integrated device manufacturer 
that can source from a foundry or make its own production, where the demand 
distribution is private information to the former. The capacity reservation equilibrium 
decisions are derived and analyzed.  
Besides market information, some studies also investigate signaling other types of 
information. Bakshi et al. (2015) consider the case where the vendor has superior 
knowledge of the product’s reliability, and such information is signaled through the 
vendor’s after-sales service contracts. Guo and Jiang (2016) examine the impact of 
consumers’ inequity aversion on a firm’s pricing and quality decisions when the firm 
can signal information of cost efficiency to its consumers through both price and quality. 
Jiang and Yang (2018) consider a two-period setting in which a firm signals private 
information of cost and quality to early consumers through prices and later customers 
can learn the product-quality information from the early customers. Chod et al. (2019) 
consider a model in which the buyer has private information about its product quality 
and suppliers face the risk of buyer default. Some studies also investigate the 
information disclosure/acquisition/updating decisions, selling strategy choices under 
asymmetric information settings; see, e.g., Dong et al. (2018), Li et al. (2018), Zhao 
and Li (2018), Lai et al. (2019), Shen et al. (2019a, 2019b), Shi and Shen (2019). In 
this work, we consider the case in which the manufacturer owns private information 
about advertising effectiveness, where advertising effectiveness is defined as the effect 
of advertising effort on product demand.  
This research is also related to the studies on advertising efforts in a supply chain 
setting. In this stream of literature, dynamic models are commonly adopted to 
investigate the effect of advertising. For example, Xie and Wei (2009) consider 




only advertises nationally but also pays a portion of the retailer’s local advertising cost. 
By deriving the equilibrium pricing and advertising decisions under non-cooperative 
and cooperative models, they demonstrated that cooperative advertising increases 
overall advertising efforts by all channel members and reduces retailer prices. Zhang et 
al. (2013) extend Xie and Wei’s (2009) model by considering the effects of advertising 
on consumers’ goodwill and reference prices. Gou et al. (2014) investigate the model 
in which advertising efforts can improve the firm’s goodwill and the market demand is 
jointed determined by goodwill and advertising effort. Nair and Narasimhan (2006) 
consider a dynamic model in which a firm’s goodwill is enabled by both advertising 
and quality efforts. They show that the advertising effort rate decreases in goodwill 
levels while quality effort rate increases in goodwill levels. Lu et al. (2016) study a joint 
pricing and advertising problem in which sales price and advertising effort can 
positively affect consumers’ reference price and hence demand. They concluded that 
dynamic pricing and dynamic advertising strategies are strategic complements and 
dominate the static strategy. Additionally, the length of the sales period plays a key role 
in determining the superiority of the two dynamic strategies. Specifically, a relatively 
short sales period highlights the value of the dynamic advertising while a long sales 
period strengthens the function of dynamic pricing. In this study, we also investigate 
the decisions on the advertising effort but in a static setting. In addition, different from 
previous studies, we assume that advertising effectiveness is the manufacturer’s private 
information, and we derive the manufacturer’s advertising effort equilibrium to signal 
the advertising effectiveness to the retailer. Other studies regarding advertising include 
Shen et al. (2019c), Chiu et al. (2018). 
Our research is most closely related to Desai (2000) and Jiang et al. (2016). Desai 
(2000) considers a supply chain in which a manufacturer intends to expand to the new 
market through a retailer. The manufacturer has multiple private information about 
demand and advertising effectiveness, and demand information is signaled via three 
decision variables, namely wholesale prices, advertising costs, and slotting allowances. 
While using the same channel structure as, we differentiate our paper from Desai (2000) 




information on the advertising effectiveness and by investigating the manufacturer’s ex 
ante preference over information sharing formats.  
 Channel members’ preference over three information sharing formats (no sharing, 
mandatory sharing, and voluntary sharing) has been discussed in Jiang et al. (2016). 
They show that the manufacturer prefers no-sharing format and the retailer prefers 
mandatory sharing. The impact of demand forecast accuracy and the risk attitude on 
information-sharing preferences is also investigated. In this work, we examine both 
mandatory information sharing and no information sharing. Our work differs from 
Jiang et al.’s (2016) by considering the manufacturer’s advertising effort, in which the 
advertising effectiveness is the private information of the manufacturer and also 
indirectly affects the market demand. We show that, unlike the results in Jiang et al. 
(2016), the manufacturer and the retailer can achieve ex ante preference alignment.  
3 Model 
Consider a supply chain consisting of one manufacturer (she) and one retailer (he), 
where the manufacturer is the brand owner and wants to expand into a new market by 
selling through the retailer. The manufacturer will take the effort to advertise her 
products. Advertising is assumed to have a positive effect on the market demand (see, 
for example, Gou et al. 2014, Desai 2000), and this effect on demand by a unit of 
advertising effort is defined as advertising effectiveness. We let 𝑒 be the advertising 
effort and 𝛽 be the advertising effectiveness. The advertising effectiveness can be 
either high or low. Since the manufacturer undertakes the advertising expenditure, the 
advertising effectiveness is her private information. Follow the common assumption in 
signaling games (Anand and Goyal 2009, Jiang et al. 2014, 2016, Li et al. 2017, Zhang 
et al. 2019), we adopt a two-pint distribution to characterize the information asymmetry. 
Specifically, 𝛽 can be either a high value 𝛽ℎ with an ex ante probability of 𝛼 or a 
low value 𝛽𝑙 with an ex ante probability of 1 − 𝛼, where 𝛽ℎ > 𝛽𝑙 > 0 and 0 ≤ 𝛼 ≤
1. As discussed in the introduction section, we consider the case in which the brand-
owning manufacturer expands to the new market through the retailer, and only the 




manufacturer knows the exact value of advertising effectiveness 𝛽 but the retailer only 
knows the prior distribution of 𝛽 . For ease of presentation, we denote 𝜃 = 𝛽ℎ/𝛽𝑙 , 
which characterizes the uncertainty of advertising effectiveness. A larger 𝜃 indicates 
a higher uncertainty level of advertising effectiveness. 
 
Figure 1. Event sequence 
The event sequence is shown in Figure 1. Stage 1 is the pre-entry stage, where the 
manufacturer first announces the information sharing format to the retailer. As 
discussed in Jiang et al. (2016), we consider two information sharing formats: no 
information sharing and mandatory information sharing. Under the no information 
sharing format, the manufacturer ex ante commits not sharing any advertising 
effectiveness information with the retailer, and under the mandatory information 
sharing format, the manufacturer ex ante commits to sharing the true advertising 
effectiveness information with the retailer. Besides the above two information sharing 
formats, Jiang et al. (2016) also discuss voluntary information sharing, where the 
manufacturer ex post decides whether to share the information after receiving it. As in 
Jiang et al.’s (2016) risk-natural case, the 𝑙 -type manufacturer wants the retailer to 
know its type (see the first paragraph of Section 4.1.1 for details) and thus chooses to 
share information, and the ℎ -type manufacturer wants to hide its identity and thus 
chooses not to share information. The retailer is also aware of it, so that in either case 
the retailer can correctly infer the manufacturer type. The ℎ-type manufacturer is then 
indifferent between sharing or not sharing. Thus, the voluntary information sharing will 
lead to the same results as mandatory information sharing. Therefore, this paper focuses 
on no information sharing and mandatory information sharing. For a given information 




usually takes time for the manufacturer to conduct advertising before entering the new 
market and that the manufacturer expands to the new market with well-developed 
products. We assume the wholesale price is determined in Stage 1. 
Then, the manufacturer enters the new market in Stage 2. At the beginning of stage 
2, the nature chooses advertising effectiveness, 𝛽𝑖, where 𝑖 = ℎ, 𝑙. The manufacturer 
observes advertising effectiveness and determines the advertising effort 𝑒. The retailer 
observes the advertising effort e, formulates his belief on the advertising effectiveness 
type, say 𝛽𝑗 , where 𝑗 = ℎ, 𝑙, and chooses the retailing price 𝑝. Note that the retailer’s 
belief may or may not be consistent with the true value. We assume the advertising 
effort by the manufacturer is observable to the retailer because the retailer can infer 
advertising effort from, for example, the publication frequency of videos and posters in 
social media after the manufacturer conducts advertising. 
The market demand is then realized. We assume that the market demand is 
𝐷 = 𝑎 − 𝑏𝑝 + 𝛽𝑖𝑒, 
where 𝑎 is the potential market size, 𝑏 is the price-sensitive parameter, and 𝛽𝑖 is the 
true advertising effectiveness. This demand function is widely used in the existing 
literature (see, for example, Dong et al. 2016, and Li 2018, Dong et al. 2019, Shi et al. 
2020). We assume that the retailer places an order after demand realization so that there 
is no demand uncertainty. We also assume that the advertisement with an advertising 
effort 𝑒 costs the manufacturer 𝑘𝑒2, where 𝑘 > 0. The quadratic advertising cost is 
also adopted by Zhang et al. (2013) and Lu et al. (2016). To rule out the trivial case that 
the manufacturer chooses an infinity advertising effort level, we assume that 𝑘 >
𝛽𝐿
2(𝛼𝜃2 + 1 − 𝛼)/8𝑏. Without loss of generality, we normalize the unit production 
cost of the product to be zero. 
To solve this problem, we use backward induction. Given that the retailer’s belief 
on advertising effectiveness is 𝛽𝑗 , he believes that the market demand would be 𝑎 −
𝑏𝑝 + 𝛽𝑗𝑒 . Suppose 𝑤 is the wholesale price per unit. The retailer determines the 
retailing price by maximizing (𝑝 − 𝑤)(𝑎 − 𝑏𝑝 + 𝛽𝑗𝑒) , which induces his optimal 
retailing price 𝑝𝑗(𝑒;𝑤) =
𝑎+𝛽𝑗𝑒+𝑏𝑤
2𝑏




as a function of 𝛽𝑗  and being aware of the true advertising effectiveness 𝛽𝑖 , the 
manufacturer’s profit, denote as Π𝑖𝑗
𝑀(𝑒;𝑤), can be written as 
        Π𝑖𝑗
𝑀(𝑒;𝑤) = 𝑤 (𝑎 − 𝑏𝑝
𝑗
(𝑒; 𝑤) + 𝛽
𝑖








) 𝑒] − 𝑘𝑒2.  (1) 
Hereafter, similar to the notation of Π𝑖𝑗
𝑀(𝑒; 𝑤), we use the first subscript “𝑖” to refer to 
the true advertising effectiveness (i.e., 𝛽𝑖) and the second subscript “𝑗” to refer to the 
retailer’s belief (i.e., 𝛽𝑗  ). We will also use superscripts “𝑀 ” and “𝑅 ” to denote the 
manufacturer and the retailer, respectively. 
The manufacturer determines the advertising effort 𝑒 by maximizing her profit 
Π𝑖𝑗




. We obtain the following proposition regarding the supply chain’s 
conditionally optimal decisions and outcomes for any given 𝑤,𝛽𝑖  and 𝛽𝑗 .  
Proposition 1. Suppose that the true advertising effectiveness is 𝛽𝑖, and the retailer’s 
























[4𝑘(𝑎 − 𝑏𝑤) + (2𝛽𝑖 − 𝛽𝑗)𝛽𝑗𝑤][4𝑘(𝑎 − 𝑏𝑤) + (2𝛽𝑖 − 𝛽𝑗  )(2𝛽𝑖 + 𝛽𝑗  )𝑤],  
respectively.  
Proposition 1 determines the conditionally optimal advertising effort and retail price 
for any given wholesale price. In the following sections, we complete the determination 
of the equilibria. Recall that the manufacturer chooses from two possible information 
sharing formats at the beginning of stage 1. For each information format, we first use 
backward analysis to derive the retailer’s optimal price, the manufacturer’s equilibrium 
advertising effort, and the wholesale price decisions. Then, we discuss the 




4 No information sharing 
Under no information sharing format, the manufacturer does not share the advertising 
effectiveness information to the retailer. Recall that the manufacturer determines the 
advertising effort 𝑒 after observing the true advertising effectiveness. The advertising 
effort 𝑒 will reflect the manufacturer’s observed information, and the retailer will use 
the advertising effort 𝑒 to update his belief on advertising effectiveness. Since the 
manufacturer can anticipate the retailer’s reaction to her advertising effort 𝑒, she may 
purposely distort the advertising effort 𝑒 to induce the retailer to formulate a belief 
that can benefit herself. Meanwhile, the retailer is also aware of the likelihood of 
information distortion. Thus, a signaling game arises between the two supply chain 
members. In this section, we first analyze the equilibrium of the signaling game 
between the manufacture and the retailer in Section 4.1, and then we discuss the 
manufacturer’s decision on the wholesale price given the equilibrium in Section 4.2. 
4.1 The signaling game equilibrium 
In a signaling game, two mutually exclusive types of equilibria might arise. The first is 
a separating equilibrium, where the manufacturer varies her advertising effort decisions 
based on advertising effectiveness, in which case the retailer can exactly infer the true 
advertising effectiveness. The second is a pooling equilibrium, where the manufacturer 
makes the same advertising effort decision no matter what the advertising effectiveness 
is, in which case the retailer cannot update his belief on the advertising effectiveness. 
We discuss these two types of equilibria in the following two subsections, respectively.  
Recall that the wholesale price 𝑤 is given when the signaling game arises. Thus, 
when we analyze the manufacturer’s signaling decision on the advertising effort 𝑒 in 
this subsection, we omit the parameter 𝑤 from the notations for ease of presentation.  
4.1.1 Separating 
For any given advertising effort 𝑒, the manufacturer prefers the retailer to choose a low 
retailing price so that the realized market demand is high. Recall that if the retailer’s 








a high advertising effectiveness 𝛽ℎ  (hereafter referred to as the “ ℎ -type 
manufacturer”), then she has the incentive to mimic that she observes low advertising 
effectiveness (hereafter referred to as the “𝑙-type manufacturer”) so that the retailer can 
set a low price. On the other hand, the 𝑙-type manufacturer has the incentive to separate 
from the ℎ-type manufacturer. This can easily verified by the relation that Πℎ𝑙
𝑀(𝑒) >
Πℎℎ
𝑀 (𝑒) > Π𝑙𝑙
𝑀(𝑒) > Π𝑙ℎ
𝑀(𝑒) and 𝑒ℎ𝑙 > 𝑒ℎℎ > 𝑒𝑙𝑙 > 𝑒𝑙ℎ from (1). That is, for any given 
advertising effort 𝑒, the ℎ-type manufacturer can obtain a higher profit by mimicking 
the 𝑙 -type manufacturer; and the 𝑙 -type manufacturer will lose profit if being 
perceived as an ℎ-type manufacturer. This is also illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2. The manufacturer’s optimal profit functions 
We use 𝛽𝑗(𝑒) to denote the updated belief of advertising effectiveness by the 
retailer after observing the manufacturer’s advertising effort 𝑒. It is intuitive that the 
manufacturer will invest more if the effort is high. Thus, we apply the following belief 
structure with a threshold on the advertising effort  ?̂?𝑠𝑒𝑝,  
𝑗(𝑒) = {
ℎ, 𝑒 > ?̂?𝑠𝑒𝑝 ,
𝑙, 𝑒 ≤ ?̂?𝑠𝑒𝑝.
 
Under this belief structure, the retailer believes that the advertising effectiveness is low 
if and only if he observes that the manufacturer’s advertising effort is no more than the 
threshold ?̂?𝑠𝑒𝑝 . To separate herself from the ℎ -type manufacturer, the 𝑙 -type 
manufacturer has to distort down his advertising effort to the extent that the ℎ-type 




manufacturer to set a high advertising effort than mimicking the 𝑙-type manufacturer’s 
decision. By maximizing the manufacturer’s profit subject to the separating condition, 
we have the following results. 
Proposition 2. Under no information sharing, there exists a unique perfect Bayesian 
separating equilibrium, where an 𝑙-type manufacturer chooses  
𝑒𝑙
𝑠𝑒𝑝 = ?̂?𝑠𝑒𝑝 = {
𝑤
4𝑘
[(2𝛽ℎ − 𝛽𝑙) − √(3𝛽ℎ − 𝛽𝑙)(𝛽ℎ − 𝛽𝑙)] , 1 < 𝜃 ≤ 3,
𝛽𝑙𝑤
4𝑘
,                                                                       𝜃 > 3,
  






   Note that 
𝛽𝑖𝑤
4𝑘
  is the optimal advertising effort when there is no information 
asymmetry between the supply chain members. Thus, from Proposition 2, if the 
advertising effectiveness uncertainty is large enough, i.e., 𝜃 > 3 , then the 𝑙 -type 
manufacturer can signal the true advertising effectiveness to the retailer without 
distorting her advertising effort. This is known as costless separating. When the 
advertising effectiveness uncertainty is not large, i.e., 1 < 𝜃 ≤ 3， the 𝑙 -type 
manufacturer has to distort the advertising effort to convince the retailer that the true 
advertising effectiveness is low. Specifically, it is easy to show that  
𝛽𝑙 − [(2𝛽ℎ − 𝛽𝑙) − √(3𝛽ℎ − 𝛽𝑙)(𝛽ℎ − 𝛽𝑙)] = √𝛽ℎ − 𝛽𝑙 ⋅ [√3𝛽ℎ − 𝛽𝑙 − √4(𝛽ℎ − 𝛽𝑙)] > 0,  
where the last inequality holds because 1 < 𝜃 ≤ 3 (or, equivalently, 𝛽𝑙 < 𝛽ℎ ≤ 3𝛽𝑙) 
implies that (3𝛽ℎ − 𝛽𝑙) > 4(𝛽ℎ − 𝛽𝑙) . This signifies that if 1 < 𝜃 ≤ 3 , then the 𝑙 -
type manufacturer has to distort down the advertising effort and hence fails to achieve 
the maximum profit under symmetric information. The 𝑙-type manufacturer’s profit 
lose due to distorting down the advertising effort is the signaling cost, and this is 
referred to as costly separating.  
4.1.2 Pooling 
Proposition 2 shows that an 𝑙 -type manufacturer may distort down the advertising 
effort 𝑒 and incur a signaling cost to separate herself from an ℎ-type manufacturer. 
When the system parameters are such that the signaling cost is too high, i.e., the 




give up separating herself from the ℎ-type one, but sets a higher advertising effort to 
pool with the ℎ-type manufacturer. The 𝑙-type manufacturer would prefer pooling if 
pooling brings her a higher profit than costly separating from an ℎ-type manufacturer 
does. For an ℎ-type manufacturer, the benefit of pretending to be an 𝑙-type is to induce 
the retailer to set a low price to increase the realized demand, and the cost of mimicking 
is decreasing in the realized demand due to the lowered advertising effort. If the 𝑙-type 
manufacturer’s advertising effort is too low, the ℎ-type manufacturer will choose her 
first-best advertising effort to separate herself. The two types of the manufacturer will 
pool only if pooling can bring them higher profit than separating. 
Since the ℎ-type manufacturer will separate herself if the advertising effort is too 
low, we adopt the following pooling belief structure as used in Guo and Jiang (2016) 
and Sun et al. (2019): There exists a threshold advertising effort ?̂?𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙 such that the 
retailer’s belief on the investment effectiveness is 𝛽ℎ if he observes an advertising 
effort 𝑒 > ?̂?𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙 and the retailer cannot update his belief if 𝑒 ≤ ?̂?𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙. That is, 
𝑗(𝑒) = {
ℎ, 𝑒 > ?̂?𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙 ,
𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, 𝑒 ≤ ?̂?𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙 .
 
If the two types of manufacturers choose to pool at advertising effort 𝑒, the retailer 
cannot update his belief on the advertising effectiveness so that his optimal retailing 
price is determined by maximizing 
                     Π𝑖𝑝
𝑅 (𝑝, 𝑒) = 𝛼Π𝑖ℎ
𝑅 (𝑝, 𝑒) + (1 − 𝛼)Π𝑖𝑙
𝑅(𝑝, 𝑒).  (2) 
Here, we replace Π𝑖𝑗
𝑅  with Π𝑖𝑝
𝑅  to denote the retailer’s belief in the pooling case. One 
can show that when facing a manufacturer with a pooling strategy, the retailer’s optimal 
retailing price is  
                       𝑝𝑝(𝑒) =
𝑎+𝜇𝑒+𝑏𝑤
2𝑏
.  (3) 
where 𝜇 = 𝛼𝛽ℎ + (1 − 𝛼)𝛽𝑙  is the ex ante expectation on the manufacturer’s 
advertising effectiveness. Then, from (1), the 𝑖-type manufacturer’s profit is 
    Π𝑖𝑝
𝑀(𝑒) = 𝑤(𝑎 − 𝑏𝑝𝑝(𝑒) + 𝛽𝑖𝑒) − 𝑘𝑒






) 𝑒] − 𝑘𝑒2.  (4) 
To derive the pooling equilibrium, we maximize 𝑖-type manufacturer’s profit subject 




choose pooling than separating. Let ?̅?(𝛼) =
𝛼2−2𝛼−3
𝛼2−4𝛼−1
. Proposition 3 thus provides the 
existence condition for a pooling equilibrium.  
Proposition 3. If 1 < 𝜃 ≤ ?̅?(𝛼), then a perfect Bayesian pooling equilibrium exists 





4.1.3 the LMSE equilibrium 
From Propositions 2 and 3, a separating equilibrium (either costly separating or costless 
separating) always exists while a pooling equilibrium only exists when 1 < 𝜃 ≤ ?̅?(𝛼). 
When there are multiple equilibria, we need to conduct the equilibrium refinement. One 
commonly adopted refinement rule is the intuitive criterion. However, as discussed in 
Mailath et al. (1993), the intuitive criterion may sometimes rule out pooling due to 
logical incompleteness, and a lexicographically maximum sequential equilibrium 
(LMSE) outcome is more plausible. Refining the equilibria by the LMSE concept in 
signaling games is adopted in many recent works (e.g., Tian and Jiang 2016, Jiang et 
al. 2016, Guo and Jiang 2016). In this work, we also adopt the LMSE concept, which 
selects the most profitable outcome for the type that wants to reveal identity. In our 
model, the 𝑙-type manufacturer has the incentive to reveal her identity and the ℎ-type 
manufacturer wants to mimic. Thus, the LMSE refinements select the equilibrium that 








. The unique LMSE is summarized in 
the following proposition.  
Proposition 4. Under no information sharing, a unique LMSE outcome exists. 
Specifically, the manufacturer will pool if 1 < 𝜃 ≤ ?̿?(𝛼) and will separate if 𝜃 >
?̿?(𝛼). 
Based on Propositions 2, 3 and 4, we depict the manufacturer’s LMSE in Figure 




axis is the uncertainty on the advertising effectiveness 𝜃. Recall that 0 ≤ 𝛼 ≤ 1 and 
𝜃 > 1. The curves  𝜃 = ?̅?(𝛼) and 𝜃 = ?̅̅?(𝛼), and the line 𝜃 = 3 divide the x-y plane 
into four parts. If 1 < 𝜃 ≤ ?̅̅?(𝛼), the manufacturer will pool, where both pooling and 
separating equilibria exist but pooling is more profitable to the 𝑙-type manufacturer. If 
?̅̅?(𝛼) < 𝜃 ≤ 3, the manufacturer will conduct a costly separating. Specifically, when 
?̅̅?(𝛼) < 𝜃 ≤ ?̅?(𝛼), pooling equilibrium exists but is not as profitable as the separating 
equilibrium for the 𝑙 -type manufacturer; and when ?̅?(𝛼) < 𝜃 ≤ 3 , pooling 
equilibrium no longer exists and separating is the unique equilibrium. If 𝜃 > 3, the 
manufacturer attains a costless separating. 
 
Figure 3. The LMSE under no information sharing. 
4.2 Manufacturer’s ex ante wholesale price 
In the previous subsection, we obtain the manufacturer’s ex post LMSE to signal 
advertising effectiveness information. In this subsection, we determine the 
manufacturer’s ex ante wholesale price given the LMSE. 
Recall that the manufacturer has different LMSE depending on the relative 
magnitude of the advertising effectiveness uncertainty level 𝜃 and the prior belief 
structure 𝛼, as shown in Figure 3. We, therefore, analyze the manufacturer’s ex ante 




ante profit is 𝐸𝑖[ Π𝑖𝑗
𝑀(𝑤)]  where the retailer’s belief 𝑗  can either be “ 𝑖 ” with 
separating equilibrium or be “𝑝” with pooling equilibrium, depending on the value of 
the advertising effectiveness 𝜃. We have the following proposition.  
Proposition 5. Under no information sharing, the manufacturer’s optimal ex ante 








































,                             𝑖𝑓 𝜃 > 3 ,
  
respectively, where 
𝛾 = (8𝛼 − 7)𝜃2 + 4(1 − 𝛼) [3𝜃 − 1 + (𝜃 − 1)√(3𝜃 − 1)(𝜃 − 1)]. 
Proposition 5 shows that the manufacturer’s optimal ex ante wholesale price has 
three possible values, depending on whether the LMSE is costless separating, costly 
separating, or pooling. We can show that the optimal wholesale price is piece wisely 
increasing in 𝜃 but not monotonic in general, as shown in the following proposition. 
Proposition 6. The optimal ex ante wholesale price increases in 𝜃 over the intervals 
(1, ?̅̅?], (?̅̅?, 3], and [3, +∞), respectively. 
Figure 4 depicts the optimal wholesale price in a numerical study. The blue solid 
curve represents the optimal ex ante wholesale price under asymmetric information. 
The dash-dotted red curve is the optimal ex ante wholesale price under symmetric 
information in which case both the manufacturer and the retailer know the advertising 
effectiveness. As depicted in Figure 4, the optimal wholesale price has jumps where the 




either higher or smaller than that under symmetric information. 
 
Figure 4. The optimal wholesale price (𝑎 = 100, 𝑏 = 20, 𝛼 = 0.1, 𝑘 = 0.5)  
Given the results in Proposition 5, we can summarize the supply chain members’ 
optimal decisions in Table 1.  
Table 1. Optimal advertising effort and retail price under no information sharing 
𝜃 𝛽𝑖 𝑒
∗ 𝑝∗ 

































































5 Mandatory Information Sharing and Preference 
In some practical situations, the manufacturer and retailer may develop a more 




information with the retailer, and the retailer makes the retailing price decision based 
on the shared information. This case is known as mandatory information sharing (Jiang 
et al. 2016). In this section, we consider investigating the supply chain members’ 
optimal decisions under mandatory information sharing in Section 5.1, and we compare 
the manufacturer’s profit under no information sharing and under mandatory 
information sharing in Section 5.2. 
5.1 Mandatory information sharing 
Under mandatory information sharing, the manufacturer will inform the retailer of the 
true advertising effectiveness after observing this information. Thus, the retailer’s belief 
is always identical to the true information, i.e., 𝛽𝑗 = 𝛽𝑖. We use a tilde ( ̃ ) over a 
variable to denote the mandatory information case.  
Recall that Proposition 1 derives the optimal decisions when the true information 
is 𝛽𝑖 and the retailer’s belief is 𝛽𝑗  without information sharing. By letting 𝑖 = 𝑗, the 
results reduce to those in the mandatory information sharing case. Thus, we have the 
following proposition. 
Proposition 7. Consider the mandatory information sharing case. Given that the true 
advertising effectiveness is 𝑖  ( 𝑖 = ℎ, 𝑙   and the wholesale price is 𝑤 , the 
manufacturer’s advertising effort is ?̃?𝑖(𝑤) =
𝛽𝑖𝑤
4𝑘





















Under mandatory information sharing, the manufacturer’s optimal wholesale price 
can be derived by maximizing 𝐸𝑖[ Π𝑖𝑖
𝑀(𝑤)] because the retailer is always informed 
with the true advertising effectiveness information. We summarize the results in the 
following proposition. 













Notice from the comparison between Propositions 5 and 8 that the manufacturer’s 
optimal ex ante wholesale price and the profit under no information sharing are the 
same as those under mandatory information sharing, respectively, only when 𝜃 > 3. In 
addition, w̃ is also the optimal ex ante wholesale price under symmetric information, 
as depicted in Figure 4. 
5.2 Format preferences 
We have obtained the supply chain members’ optimal decisions under both no 
information sharing and mandatory information sharing. Note that the information 
sharing format is chosen at the first stage before the manufacturer observes the true 
information. Therefore, we can compare their ex ante profits to reveal the 
manufacturer’s and the retailer’s preference over the two information sharing formats.  
Recall that under no information sharing format, the manufacturer’s signaling 
equilibrium depends on 𝜃 and 𝛼, and thus the manufacturer’s ex ante profit has three 
possible values. Under mandatory information sharing, however, the manufacturer’s 
optimal profit is unique. By comparing the profits under the two information sharing 
formats, we obtain the following proposition.  
Proposition 9. The manufacturer always prefers mandatory information sharing 
format, i.e., Π̃𝑀 ≥ ΠM.  
Proposition 9 shows that the manufacturer’s ex ante profit under mandatory 
information sharing is no less than that under no information sharing. This is because 
the 𝑙 -type manufacturer under no information sharing has to distort down the 
advertising effort to signal the information, which causes signaling cost. In Jiang et al. 
(2016), where the manufacturer signals the market size information through the 
wholesale price, the manufacturer also prefers mandatory information format because 
of the signaling cost incurred under no information sharing format.  




than mandatory information sharing. This is because, under no information sharing 
format, the manufacturer’s distorting down on the wholesale price endows the retailer 
with a higher marginal profit and thus benefits the retailer. Therefore, the manufacturer 
and the retailer have misalignment in the information sharing format. However, in our 
model, we find that the manufacturer and the retailer can achieve alignment. We depict 
the retailer’s ex ante profit Π𝑅  and Π̃
𝑅 in Figure 5 through a numerical study. In this 
example, the manufacturer chooses to pool when 𝜃 ≤ 1.5  and achieves costless 
separating when 𝜃 ≥ 3. We can see that in this numerical example, the retailer’s profit 
under mandatory information sharing is weakly higher than that under no information 
sharing. In fact, we obtain ΠR ≤ Π̃R in an extensive numerical study by varying 
system parameters. However, the complexity of Π̃𝑅 − Π𝑅  prevents us from 
establishing the result theoretically.  
 
Figure 5. Numerical comparison of Π𝑅 and Π̃𝑅 (𝑎 = 100, 𝑏 = 20, 𝛼 = 0.1, 𝑘 = 0.5) 
The retailer’s preference in our model differs from Jiang et al.’s (2016) because the 
manufacturer signals information through the advertising effort rather than the 
wholesale price. When the manufacturer distorts down the wholesale price to signal 
information as in Jiang et al. (2016), the retailer can benefit from the increased profit 




information as in our case, the retailer will also suffer from the lowered advertising 
effort because the advertising effort positively correlated with the market demand. 
Therefore, when the manufacturer signals the advertising effectiveness through the 
advertising effort, the manufacturer and the retailer can achieve aligned preference over 
the information sharing format, i.e., mandatory information sharing.  
We also compare the advertising efforts under the two information sharing formats 
and obtain the following proposition. 
Proposition 10. The manufacturer will invest less on the advertising effort under no 
information sharing format than under the mandatory information sharing format; that 
is, 𝑒 ≤ ?̃?. 
Proposition 10 shows that the manufacturer tends to invest less when the 
manufacturer has to signal under no information sharing format than when she ex ante 
commits to sharing the true information. This is because signal is costly for the 
manufacturer so that the incentive to take advertising effort decreases. 
6 Conclusion 
In this paper we study a manufacturer’s choice of information sharing format with a 
retailer, where the manufacturer expands to the new market through the retailer and has 
private information on advertising effectiveness. Under no information sharing format, 
we investigate both separating and pooling equilibria for the signaling game; and under 
mandatory information sharing format, we derive the optimal solution through a 
stylized model. The comparison of the manufacturer’s ex ante profit indicates that the 
manufacturer always prefers mandatory information sharing, which turns out to be 
consistent with the retailer’s preference by a numerical study. We also show that the 
manufacturer’s advertising effort under no information sharing format is no greater than 
that under the mandatory information sharing format. 
 In closing, we acknowledge the following limitations of our model. First, we only 
consider static advertising decisions since we extend the study on advertising effort to 




game model with dynamic advertising (e.g., Nair and Narasimhan 2006, Gou 2014) or 
with a general distribution of information asymmetry (e.g., Li and Zhou 2019, Li and 
Zhang 2008, Gal-Or et al. 2008). Second, we assume that there is no risk associated 
with entering the new market. Therefore, considering international business risks such 
as gray market and buyer default or incorporating supply chain members’ risk attitude 
(e.g., Choi et al. 2016, Ma et al. 2019) can be another possible extension. 
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